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Article 20

THANKS , OBAMA ! “FAIR PAY AND SAFE WORKPLACES ” COME AT THE COST OF
MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
By
Andrew C. Fillmore*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law Executive Order
13673, titled “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” which imposed changes to labor laws in
the United States.1 In an attempt to “increase efficiency and cost savings” in the work
performed by government contractors, the President transformed the way these federal
contractors are regulated.2 Specifically, the Executive Order prohibits companies with
federal contracts greater than $1 million from including mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in employee contracts for claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19643 (“Title VII”) or any tort related to sexual assault or harassment.4 With few
exceptions to the requirement, the President believes this will help improve contractors’
compliance with labor laws.5
The Executive Order expands a similar policy enacted by Congress in 2009,
commonly known as the Franken Amendment, which restricts arbitration in certain
circumstances for Department of Defense contractors.6 Excluding the Franken
Amendment, Congress has been consistently unwilling to pass legislation that would
further limit mandatory arbitration for all general consumers and employees.7
The issuance of the Executive Order is controversial for numerous reasons. First,
although the President maintains authority to issue executive orders governing the

*

Andrew C. Fillmore is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, a 2016 Juris
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1

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter Executive Order].

2

Id.

3

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (“Equal Employment
Opportunity.”).
4

See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order,
W HITEHOUSE .GOV
(July
31,
2014),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
5

See id.

6

Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454
(2009).

7

See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R.
310, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Executive Branch,8 executive orders may by subject to judicial review or overriding
legislative action.9 Second, the Executive Order appears to be the President’s way of
circumventing a gridlocked Congress to create new law.10 Additionally, the restriction on
arbitration contradicts years of established Supreme Court precedent and several wellrespected interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act11 (“FAA”).12 This Executive
Order also presents the issue of permanence; a new presidential administration can easily
repeal President Obama’s limits on arbitration.13 Ultimately, the Executive Order will
likely result in an increase in the financial costs of contracting with the federal
government, a cost that will eventually be passed through to the U.S. taxpayers.14
Although not readily apparent, the issuance of this Executive Order creates the potential
for great costs and balance of powers complications in the near future.
This article will discuss the significance of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces
Executive Order and its impact on arbitration in the United States. Part II will examine
the details and language of the Executive Order, in its entirety. Part III will investigate
the historical basis of the arbitral language of the Executive Order and compare how the
language has evolved. Part IV will consider the conflicts of arbitrability that arise among
the Executive Order and several U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Finally, Part V concludes
with an analysis of the consequences impacting multiple branches of the Government,
federal contractors, and employees as a result of the Executive Order.

8

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014) (“By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 40 U.S.C. 121, and in order to
promote economy and efficiency in procurement by contracting with responsible sources who comply with
labor laws, it is hereby ordered . . . .”).
9

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also John C. Duncan Jr., A
Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 V T . L.
R EV . 333, 362, 369-70 (2010).
10

See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills, W ASHINGTON P OST
(July 9, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113thcongress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills/.
11

The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2013).

12

See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
556 U.S. 247 (2009); Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
13

See generally Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential
Directives, 5 T EX . R EV . L. & P OL . 267, 305 (2001).
14

See Geoff Burr, Nothing’s Fair About Obama’s Fair Pay Order, G OVEXEC .COM (Sept. 12, 2014),
available
at
http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2014/09/nothings-fair-about-obamas-fair-payorder/93866/.
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II.  DETAILS OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
The goal of the Executive Order is to “increase efficiency and cost savings in the
work performed by parties who contract with the Federal Government by ensuring that
they understand and comply with labor laws.”15 The Administration provides support for
the Executive Order’s change to labor law compliance by referencing a 2010 report
issued by the Government Accountability Office, which found that many companies cited
for labor law violations received government contracts.16 The Executive Order was
designed to help ensure that “all hardworking Americans get the fair pay and safe
workplaces they deserve.”17
In addition to the impact on arbitration, the Executive Order includes two major
provisions for government contractors: (1) mandatory disclosure of prior labor law
violations,18 and (2) greater paycheck transparency for employers.19
A.  Disclosures of Labor Law Violations
The Executive Order provides that all companies seeking to bid on government
contracts for goods and services in excess of $500,000 must represent any administrative
merits determination, arbitral award or decision, or civil judgment rendered against the
bidder within the preceding three-year period for any violation of labor laws.20
Additionally, the Executive Order requires the newly created “Labor Compliance
Advisors” to review these disclosures and determine whether an offeror is a responsible
source that has a “satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.”21 The Labor
Compliance Advisors will consult with the Department of Labor in establishing the
appropriate standards.22 Additionally, these disclosure requirements cover any
subcontractors that the potential contractor would utilize for the fulfillment of the

15

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

16

See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order,
W HITEHOUSE .GOV
(July
31,
2014),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order (reporting that almost twothirds of the fifty largest wage and hour violations and nearly forty percent of the fifty largest workplace
health and safety penalties from FY2005 to FY 2009 were at companies that went on to receive new
government contracts).
17

See Fact Sheet, supra note 4.

18

See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

19

See id.

20

See id.

21

See id.

22

See id.
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contract.23 After the contract has been awarded, the Executive Order requires that each
federal contractor and subcontractor, subject to the pre-award notifications, provide
updates on any labor law violations every six months for the duration of the contract.24
B.  Paycheck Transparency
The Executive Order creates an additional requirement for federal contractors
with contracts in excess of $500,000 to be more transparent with an employee’s
paycheck.25 Each pay period, contractors must provide all individuals performing work
under the contract with a document that clearly details that individual’s hours worked,
overtime hours, pay, and any additions or deductions made to the individual’s pay.26 This
requirement is also incorporated for any subcontractors working on the project.27
Additionally, if the contractor is treating an individual performing work under a contract
or subcontract as an independent contractor, and not as an employee, the contractor must
provide a document clearly informing the individual of this status.28
C.  Complaint and Dispute Transparency
The Executive Order limits mandatory pre-dispute arbitration by stating:
(a)   Agencies shall ensure that for all contracts where the estimated value
of the supplies acquired and services required exceeds $1 million,
provisions in solicitations and clauses in contracts shall provide that
contractors agree that the decision to arbitrate claims arising under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of
sexual assault or harassment may only be made with the voluntary consent
of employees or independent contractors after such disputes
arise. Agencies shall also require that contractors incorporate this same
requirement into subcontracts where the estimated value of the supplies
acquired
and
services
required
exceeds
$1
million.
(b)  Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to contracts or

23

See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

24

See id.

25

See id.

26

See id.

27

See id.

28

See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).
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subcontracts for the acquisition of commercial items or commercially
available off-the-shelf items.
(c)  A contractor's or subcontractor's agreement under subsection (a) of this
section to arbitrate certain claims only with the voluntary post-dispute
consent of employees or independent contractors shall not apply with
respect to:
(i)  employees who are covered by any type of collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the contractor and a labor
organization
representing
them;
or
(ii)  employees or independent contractors who entered into a valid
contract to arbitrate prior to the contractor or subcontractor bidding
on a contract covered by this order, except that a contractor's or
subcontractor's agreement under subsection (a) of this section to
arbitrate certain claims only with the voluntary post-dispute
consent of employees or independent contractors shall apply if the
contractor or subcontractor is permitted to change the terms of the
contract with the employee or independent contractor, or when the
contract is renegotiated or replaced.29
As a result of the Executive Order, with the exception of limited situations,30 all
federal contractors with a contract dated after July 31, 2014, in excess of $1 million, will
need to carefully modify their employment contracts to provide for exceptions to
arbitrability to provide employees their day in court and avoid violation.31
III.

THE FRANKEN AMENDMENT – THE BASIS FOR THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

The arbitration provision in the Executive Order is an expansion of an amendment
to the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,32 which was enacted by
Congress in 2009 and applicable only to Department of Defense contractors.33 The
29

See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

30

See id. (finding certain exceptions are made for commercial items or commercially available off-the-shelf
items, employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, or employees or independent contractors
who entered into a valid contract to arbitrate prior to bidding on a federal contract).
31

See Fact Sheet, supra note 4.

32

H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116 (2009).

33

See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order,
W HITEHOUSE .GOV
(July
31,
2014),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order (noting that the Department of
Defense is the largest federal contracting agency).
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legislation was introduced by Minnesota Senator, Al Franken, and subsequently became
known as the Franken Amendment.34 The Franken Amendment was prompted by Jones
v. Halliburton Co.35 (“Jones”), a case involving the rape of Jamie Leigh Jones, a female
government contractor, by her co-workers.36 Jones brought an action against her former
employer, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), for tort claims based on her alleged sexual
assault.37 KBR responded with an attempt to compel arbitration per the terms of the
employment contract.38 The Fifth Circuit concluded that a valid agreement to arbitrate
existed, but ultimately determined that four of Jones’ claims should not be submitted to
arbitration, because these claims were not related to the employment contract.39
Compelled by Jones, Congress sought to introduce legislation that would prevent
similar situations from occurring in the future.40 Senator Franken explained his belief that
arbitration was an efficient forum for commercial disputes, however, unfit for “claims of
sexual assault and egregious violations of civil rights.”41 Senator Franken authored an
amendment which prohibited Department of Defense contractors with contracts in excess
of $1 million from requiring employees to arbitrate claims arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or tort claims related to or arising out of sexual assault or
harassment.42 In order for the amendment to garner enough support to pass, members of
the House and Senate required certain modifications to narrow the application of the
amendment.43 One modification included the addition of a waiver clause, which granted
the Secretary of Defense the authority to bypass the arbitration requirements where
“necessary to avoid harm to the national security interests of the United States.”44 The

34

Jeffrey Adams, The Assault of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman’s Horror Story Is Changing
Arbitration in America, 11 P EPP. D ISP. R ESOL . L.J. 253, 258-61 (2011) (discussing the legislative
introduction of the Franken Amendment).
35

Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).

36

See generally Jones, 583 F.3d at 228.

37

See id.

38

See id.

39

See generally Jones, 583 F.3d at 242 (affirming the district court that the plaintiff’s claims for (1) assault
and battery; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the alleged assault; (3) negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision of employees involved in the alleged assault; and (4) false imprisonment,
do not touch matters related to employment required to go to arbitration).
40

155 Cong. Rec. S10028 (Oct. 1, 2009).

41

155 Cong. Rec. S10028 (Oct. 1, 2009) (explaining that due to the privacy of arbitration, serious
violations are hidden from the public and also fails to establish precedent for future cases).
42

See Adams, supra note 34.

43

See Adams, supra note 34.
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second modification required was to limit the amendment to apply only to federal
contracts with a value greater than $1 million.45
Following the passage of the Franken Amendment, Senator Franken sponsored
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011.46 This legislation stated that no pre-dispute
arbitration agreement would be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment, consumer, or civil rights dispute.47 This proposed expansion on the limits to
arbitration was referred to a congressional committee, but eventually failed.48
Periodically since 2002, similar legislation has been introduced in Congress, but has
consistently failed to gather the requisite support to become binding law.49
IV.
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER CONTRADICTS THE FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING
ARBITRATION
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act50 (“FAA”) which
legitimizes arbitration agreements and establishes a presumption in favor of their
enforceability.51 Included in §1 of the FAA was an employment contract exclusion.52
Under this exclusion, the FAA would not apply to the resolution of disputes that arise
44

See Jeffrey Adams, The Assault of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman’s Horror Story Is Changing
Arbitration in America, 11 P EPP. D ISP. R ESOL . L.J. 253, 258-61 (2011) ( “(a) The Secretary of Defense may
waive, in accordance with paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section, the applicability of paragraphs (a) or (b)
of 222.7402, to a particular contract or subcontract, if the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary personally determines
that the waiver is necessary to avoid harm to national security interests of the United States, and that the term of
the contract or subcontract is not longer than necessary to avoid such harm.”).
45

See generally Adams, supra note 34; see also H.R. 3326, 111 th Cong. § 8116 (2009).

46

H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2002); see also, Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.
2013).
50

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2013).

51

See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (concluding that
“questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”).

52

The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2013) (“. . . but nothing herein
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”).
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from employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate commerce.53 Over the years,
the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually interpreted the meaning of the text and explained
that there should be a narrow reading of the FAA’s employment contract exclusion.54
The abovementioned narrowing of the FAA’s employment contract exclusion is
one example of how the U.S. Supreme Court has generally expanded the scope of
arbitrability. The following five U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrate how the Court has
created general federal policy favoring arbitration.55
Initially, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,56 the Court examined under which
circumstances, if any, an employee’s statutory right to trial under Title VII may be
foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of a CBA.57 The Court held that an employee’s statutory right
to judicial de novo review under Title VII was not foreclosed by prior submission of the
claim to arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a CBA.58 This early
employment arbitration decision resurrected the old judicial mistrust of arbitrators to
oversee important claims, such as Title VII.59
In an attempt to resolve a circuit split, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,60 the
Court reviewed the application of the employment exemption in the FAA for
employment contracts.61 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the employment contract
exemption shall be interpreted to apply only to the employment contracts of workers
directly involved in the interstate transport of goods and services.62 As a result,
employers are permitted to include arbitration requirements within the employment
contracts of all other employees.63
53

The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2013)

54

See Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001) (expanding on the scope of interstate
commerce).
55

See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 at 24.

56

See Alexander v. Gardner - Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

57

See id.

58

See id. at 59-60.

59

See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 267 (2009) (referring to the decision in Gardner - Denver
as “pervaded by . . . ‘the old judicial hostility to arbitration.’” as cited in Rodriguez de Ouijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989)).
60

See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105.

61

See id. at 109.

62

See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105.

63

See id.
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In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,64 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with
answering the question of whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that
required union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”)65 was enforceable.66 In another 5-4 decision, the
Court held that in a CBA which “clearly and unmistakably”67 waived an individuals
rights to court and required the arbitration of ADEA claims was enforceable.68 Although
not clearly stated, this decision repudiated the precedence of Gardner-Denver and found
the recourse to arbitration of Civil Rights claims to be acceptable and enforceable.69
Finally, in 2011, the Court released a monumental opinion with AT&T Mobility,
LLC v. Concepcion.70 The case involved the controversial issue of class action waivers in
consumer arbitration contracts.71 In Concepcion, the Court examined whether the savings
clause72 in § 2 of the FAA preempted state law with regard to class action waivers.73 The
Court broadly held that the main goal of the FAA was to ensure the enforcement of
private arbitration agreements according to their terms; therefore, conflicting state law
was preempted.74 Furthermore, the Court also acknowledged the issue of adhesive
arbitration agreements and found the agreements to be presumptively valid, regardless of
the appearance of a disproportionate bargaining power between the contracting parties.75

64

See 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247.

65

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§6101-07 (2014).

66

See generally 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247.

67

See id. at 274.

68

See generally 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247.

69

See 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 249 (“That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of
arbitration that this Court has since abandoned” in reference to Gardner-Denver).
70

See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740.

71

See id. at 1744.

72

See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
73

See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (finding the Discover Bank rule, which disfavors class waivers in
consumer contracts, conflicts with the provisions of FAA §2 intended to place arbitration agreements “on
equal footing with other contracts.”).
74

See generally Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740.

75

See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33
(1991) (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.”).
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You really should summarize here about the policy or note the evolution towards
favoring arbitration. Then add in specifically how the EO impacts this. Otherwise this
section seems kind of out of place and unnecessary. Just tie it in to what your point is
with the dichotomy between Supreme Court jurisprudence and the EO. It can just be a
paragraph.
V.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR ALL PARTIES IMPACTED
Although the Executive Order only contains brief language on arbitration, the
consequences of this Order are wide-spread for the many parties involved.
A.  Federal Government
The Fair Play and Safe Workplaces Executive Order demonstrates the conflicting
views on the role of arbitration among the separate branches of government. The
President, exercising his executive power, issued the Executive Order prohibiting
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for federal contracts.76 The President justifies these
actions by claiming that the exclusion will “help improve contractors’ compliance with
labor laws.”77 Unlike the congressionally approved Franken Amendment, here, the
President has unilaterally enacted law to impose a push for greater oversight of labor
practices throughout the Federal Government.78 The President’s orders will be considered
valid only when the issue stems from a statutory delegation or from the U.S.
Constitution.79 Here, the President anchors his executive authority to issue his Executive
Order in not only the U.S. Constitution, but also 40 U.S.C. 121, related to his managerial
functions over federal property and administrative services.80 As noted by the Supreme
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,81 however, when acting without
congressional reinforcement, the President is acting with a lesser variety of power.82

76

See generally Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

77

See Fact Sheet, supra note 4.

78

See Fact Sheet, supra note 4.

79

Tara L. Branum, President Or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America,
28 J. L EGIS. 1, 63-64 (2002) (citing to Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668
(1981) quoting Youngstown).
80

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

81

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.

82

John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the
Executive Role, 35 V T . L. R EV . 333, 385 (2010) (citing to Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in
Youngstown where the President can act with congress, when congress is silent, or contrary to congress).
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While Congress has failed to pass legislation prohibiting arbitration in similar
situations, 83 it has remained silent on the issue underlying the Executive Order. Congress
has the authority to endorse or revoke all or part of an order, either by directly repealing
the order or by removing the underlying authority on which the order is predicated.84 A
1999 Cato Institute study examining the congressional review of executive orders found
that Congress had modified or revoked 239 executive orders.85 Due to the extensive
process involved and the current congressional stalemate, Congress is likely to remain
silent on the issue of whether the President is overstepping his authority with the
Executive Order.86 This silent congressional inaction may be mistakenly seen by the U.S.
Supreme Court as congressional affirmation.87
The U.S. Supreme Court holds an opposing view from the President’s Executive
Order and appears content on expanding the “federal policy favoring arbitration.”88 Over
the years, the Supreme Court has allowed a majority of issues to proceed to arbitration,
including mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts and
Title VII claims.89 Much like the President’s Executive Order, the progressive
interpretation of the FAA by the Supreme Court has been performed and unchallenged in
light of the congressional silence. Although there is judicial deference, the Supreme
Court also has the authority to review and overturn the President’s Executive Order by
declaring the order to be unconstitutional.90

83

See generally Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2002); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R.
1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
84

See Duncan Jr., supra note 82.

85

See generally Branum, supra note 79; see also John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders:
Washington
–
Obama,
The
American
Presidency
Project,
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last modified Oct. 20, 2014) (finding there have been
15,245 Executive Orders issued between 1798 and October, 20, 2014); see also Vivian S. Chu & Todd
Garvey, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, (April 16, 2014),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf (“One study has suggested that less than 4% of executive orders
have been modified by Congress.”); see also Duncan Jr., supra note 82.
86

Bump, supra note 10.

87

See Duncan Jr., supra note 82.

88

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies
to the contrary.”).
89

See generally Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105; 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 249.

90

See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the
Executive Role, 35 V T . L. R EV . 333, 376, 392 (2010) (citing Youngstown).
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This was the situation in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich91 which related to a
challenge on President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,954 preventing federal contractors
from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers.92 The President used his
authority93 to create an order designed “to ensure economical and efficient administration
and completion of Federal Government contracts.”94 Similar to the current Executive
Order, Reich raised the larger issue of whether a president may regulate private
employment conduct without intruding on the lawmaking powers of Congress.95 Upon
judicial review, President Clinton attempted to justify his actions under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act96 (“Procurement Act”).97 The Court noted,
however, that the Procurement Act does not provide the President with unlimited
authority to make decisions he believes will likely result in savings to the government.98
The Supreme Court ultimately revoked the executive order, finding that the President’s
actions explicitly violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)99 and hence the
will of Congress.100
After review of Reich, it appears possible that an employer organization
representing federal contractors could raise a judicial challenge to President Obama’s

91

Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

92

See Duncan Jr., supra note 82.

93

Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13023 (Mar. 8, 1995) (“[B]y the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 40 U.S.C. 486(a) and 3 U.S.C.
301 . . . .”).
94

See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the
Executive Role, 35 V T . L. R EV . 333, 389 n.440 (2010) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13023
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authority to issue the Executive Order impacting labor laws.101 In reality, however, the
chances that the courts would overturn the Executive Order are remote.102
Additionally, the President’s directives that have not been ratified by Congress are
only as permanent as the succeeding President.103 A new administration has the authority
to explicitly amend, replace, or revoke executive orders as simply as signing a new
executive order.104 As a result, certain executive orders have become a political “tug-ofwar” with each subsequent administration.105 Depending on the political affiliation and
associated policies, the new administration in 2016 will easily be able to modify the
Executive Order if desired.
Moreover, the Executive Order creates financial costs to be incurred by the
federal government for ensuring compliance and prosecuting violators of the new labor
laws on an on-going basis. The newly created Labor Compliance Advisors will be
responsible for enforcing these tasks under the Department of Labor.106 Unlike the onetime compliance requirements prohibiting arbitration in employment contracts for federal
contractors, several parts of the Executive Order requires that the government receive
updates from all contractors and sub-contractors every six months.107
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B. Federal Government Contractors
As a result of the Executive order, doing business with the US Government has
become significantly less attractive for government contractors by prohibiting mandatory
arbitration. The administration estimates that the Executive Order will impact 24,000
large and small businesses.108 These businesses vie for federal contracts in a marketplace
worth approximately $500 billion per year.109 As a result of the prohibition on mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses for employees and independent contractors, businesses
will lose significant autonomy, thus creating significant hardships. Recent studies have
found that an estimated 25% of all American employers use mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.110 These employers must now modify
their employment contracts not only for employees directly working under a federallyfunded contract, but also those employees in non-governmental roles.111 Additionally, as
stated throughout all portions of the Executive Order, direct contractors now have the
added responsibility of enforcing and monitoring the employment contracts in place for
any subcontractors utilized to ensure their own compliance.112 This is not only an added
expense, but a heavy burden placed on both large and small businesses.
The Executive Order will impact the financial costs of doing business with the
federal government. Arbitration functions as an alternative to judicial litigation through
less expensive, expedited, and fair proceedings.113 Contractors will now look to
recuperate the potential cost of less efficient and often unpredictable judicial litigation of
claims.114 The financial impact of the Executive Order will be felt by employers by
increasing the cost, as traditional judicial means tend to be more expensive, and by

108

See Burr, supra note 14.

109

See Burr, supra note 14.

110

Ashley M. Sergeant, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses,
57 S.D. L. R EV . 149, 157 n.98 (2012).
111

See Rebekah Mintzer, Executive Order Requires New Labor Disclosures, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug.
4, 2014), available at http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202665572168/Executive-Order-Requires-NewLabor-Disclosures?slreturn=20140918124200.
112

See generally Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014).

113

See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 123.

114

See Burr, supra note 14; see also Dierich Knauth, Contractors Say Executive Order Contradicts Labor
Laws, Law360 (Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/586901/contractors-sayexecutive-order-contradicts-labor-laws) (finding that industry trade group experts estimate that this
administration’s push for greater oversight could cause contractors compliance costs to raise by as much as
25 percent); see also T HOMAS E. C ARBONNEAU , A RBITRATION L AW A ND P RACTICE 500 (6th ed. 2012).

250  

providing potentially increased damage awards to plaintiffs by sympathetic jurors.115
These increased costs for judicial litigation of employment disputes will discourage
contract participation, specifically for smaller businesses, leading to larger awarded bids
which will ultimately be borne by the U.S. taxpayers.116
Although the Executive Order’s full consequential impact on contractors will
remain unknown in the near future, contractors will likely attempt to circumvent the
associated restriction on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in a number of ways.
Contractors could do so by adding certain modifications to their employment contracts.
Contractors may include pre-dispute jury waivers in their contracts to prevent runaway
and unpredictable jury trials where excessive awards can cripple a business.117
Alternatively, contractors may attempt to include limits on punitive damages in their
employment contracts for judicial awards. This is similar to contracting parties in an
arbitration agreement limiting the amount of punitive damages awarded by an
arbitrator.118 Contractors may also attempt to limit the impact of the Executive Order to
selective employees by creating wholly owned subsidiaries, exclusively for federal
contracts. This major transformation would prevent the prohibition on mandatory predispute arbitration from applying to employees within the entire organization. Although
these methods of eluding the Executive Order may create their own burdens, contractors
that are negatively impacted by the President’s actions may be willing to push the
boundaries in order to spark a reaction from Congress or challenge the Executive Order
in the judicial system.
C. Employees
The intended beneficiaries of the Executive Order are the employees of government
contractors who will now be given “a day in court,” while still allowing for employees to
pursue voluntary post-dispute consensual arbitration.119 During the passage of the
Franken Amendment, one Senator in support of the bill estimated that “at least 30 million
115
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workers have unknowingly signed employment contracts and waived their constitutional
rights to have their civil rights resolved by a jury.”120 Proponents of greater employee
rights have argued that arbitration is unsuitable for employment issues, specifically for
claims of civil rights’ violations or sexual harassment.121 One argument consistently
raised is the lack of transparency in arbitration due to the absence of a jury of one’s peers
and no judicial precedence for the arbitrator to respect.122 Furthermore, judicial
adjudication more frequently allows for an employee to be awarded punitive damages
and injunctive relief as a deterrent to undesirable employer behaviors.123 Moreover,
proponents argue that the arbitrator is less accountable than a traditional judge.124
Employee rights advocates have argued that when the employment contract calls for the
employer to pay the arbitrators, this creates the appearance of impropriety with the
potential for “repeat players” bias.125 Moreover, employees impacted by the Executive
Order will now be able to bring a claim in a local forum, reducing their travel costs and
other associated expenses.126 An additional argument presented is that the privacy offered
through arbitration is inappropriate for Civil Rights claims and claims of sexual assault or
harassment, as this privacy protection diminishes the publics’ retribution for
employers.127
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One exception permitted under the Executive Order is for employees who are
covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the contractor and
representative of the labor organization.128 This exception exemplifies the distinction
between labor arbitration and employment arbitration. The reasoning for this exception in
the Order can be justified by the comparable bargaining power of the union
representative and the employer to negotiate the employment contract.129 A similar notion
exists in the Ninth Circuit, where the Court remains hostile to arbitration.130 Additionally,
the Executive Order may be a way for President Obama to incentivize the Federal
Government to contract or subcontract with unionized employers.131 While many
employee rights groups will likely support the CBA exemption in the Order, the impact
of the exemption will presumably be minimal; only 11.3% of the U.S. workforce belongs
to a union.132 Overall, similar to the Franken Amendment, many employee rights
advocates will likely consider that this Executive Order to be a step in the right direction
and will eventually lead to further expansion in all employment contracts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With the issuance of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order,
President Obama has single-handily imposed significant changes to labor laws
regulating government contractors in an attempt to increase efficiency and cost savings
in the work performed. Specifically, the President’s ban on mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employee contracts for federal contracts and conflicts with
the federal policy favoring arbitration. This governmental restriction on arbitration
runs contrary to decades of Supreme Court precedent allowing arbitration in many
different contexts, including employment agreements and Title VII claims.
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As a result of the Executive Order providing employees with the option of
pursuing judicial resolution of disputes, there will be negative consequences for both
the federal government and potential government contractors. The compliance costs of
enforcing the Executive Order will financially impact the federal government,
contractors, and ultimately, the U.S. taxpayers. Federal contractors are now forced to
scrupulously craft their employment contracts to allow employees to pursue certain
claims in the costly and often inefficient, judicial setting. Ultimately, the Executive
Order promoting fair pay and safe workplaces in the Federal Government comes with
costs that far outweighs the benefits.
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